Court approval is required in the following situations. Whenever court approval is sought, the court commonly reviews additional matters such as the reasonableness of attorney fees, the expenses incurred, and whether payments made for the benefit of minors or incapacitated persons are being properly handled.

• Settlements involving a minor or incapacitated person:
Minors and incapacitated persons do not have the legal capacity to enter into binding contracts, including settlement agreements. Court approval is recommended to ensure the settlement is reasonable and to protect all parties from future claims by the minor or incapacitated person. In very small cases, clients may make a business judgment that the risk of a later challenge is low enough that court approval is not worth the additional cost.

• Medical malpractice settlements involving payment by the Kansas Health Care Stabilization Fund: If the Kansas Health Care Stabilization Fund is contributing to a settlement, court approval is required. The court must specifically find that the settlement is “valid, just and equitable” under Kansas law (K.S.A. 40-3410), and will also review the reasonableness of attorney fees (K.S.A. 7-121b).

• Wrongful death settlements:
Court approval of the settlement itself is not required. However, the court must hold a hearing to apportion the settlement among the heirs (K.S.A. 60-1905).

Possibly, but it depends on whether dual representation is allowed under the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct.

Under Rule 1.7, a lawyer cannot represent two clients if their interests are directly adverse or if there is a substantial risk that the lawyer’s responsibilities to one client will materially limit the representation of the other. However, even if a potential conflict exists, a lawyer may represent both clients if:

• The lawyer reasonably believes competent and diligent representation can be provided to each client,

• The law does not prohibit the representation,

• The representation does not involve one client making a claim directly against the other, and

• Each client gives informed consent in writing.

In the context of a lawsuit against a company and its employee, dual representation is sometimes possible if their defenses are aligned and neither party is blaming the other. However, if their interests diverge — for example, if the company wants to argue that the employee alone was at fault, or vice versa — then dual representation would not be allowed, and separate attorneys would be needed. Before proceeding with dual representation, we will evaluate whether the necessary conditions are met and will seek informed, written consent from both parties.

Kansas law does not allow a plaintiff to state an exact amount of damages in the petition if they are seeking more than $75,000 and the amount is not capable of mathematical certainty. Instead, they must simply allege that they are seeking “an amount in excess of $75,000.” This is a procedural rule (K.S.A. 60-208(b)) and does not necessarily reflect the true amount the plaintiff is seeking.

The actual amount the plaintiff claims can be requested through a Rule 118 request. Within two weeks of the request, the plaintiff must file and serve a response stating a specific dollar amount, which will be higher than $75,000. Even then, the amount stated may or may not be reasonable. If the plaintiff later wants to increase the amount claimed, they must file a motion and show good cause. However, they can reduce the amount without court approval. This can incentivize plaintiffs to start with a higher number at the beginning of the case.

A Reservation of Rights means the insurance company is defending you for now but may later deny coverage — and may also withdraw its defense if it determines the claims are not covered. It protects the insurer’s ability to contest coverage while still providing a defense during the case.

It depends. As a general rule, non-compete agreements are enforceable, but the employer must have a protectable interest in your work. So, if you have little to no customer contact or what you sell is very different than what you will be selling in your new job, the limitations may not be enforceable. Contact an attorney experienced in these matters to discuss your particular situation.

On June 14, 2019, the Kansas Supreme Court in Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd (No. 112,765) struck down K.S.A. 60-19a02, which capped non-economic damages in personal injury actions.

Hilburn was an automobile negligence case. The jury awarded the injured plaintiff $335,000, comprising $33,490.86 in economic damages for medical expenses and $301,509.14 in non-economic “pain and suffering” damages. The trial court, applying the K.S.A. 60-19a02 cap reduced the non-economic damages award to $250,000. [Note: In 2014, the Legislature increased the cap to $325,000 and allowed for an increase to $350,000 after July 1, 2022.]

A divided Court held that the statutory cap violates the “right to trial by jury” in Section 5 of the Kansas Bill of Rights by intruding “upon the jury’s determination of the compensation owed to redress her injury.” The Court rejected its own quid pro quo test in Miller v. Johnson 295 Kan. 636 (2012) for deciding the constitutionality of a statutory non-economic damages cap.

The Hilburn decision creates uncertainty about the future of other statutory damage caps. Miller was a medical negligence case. Although the Hilburn Court rejected the Miller Court’s rationale, the Hilburn Court did not decide the constitutionality of the cap in a medical negligence case. Historically, Kansas has considered statutory caps for medical negligence separately from those for other personal injury actions. However, the plaintiff’s bar argues that since 1988, Kansas has not statutorily differentiated between the caps.

Given this uncertainty, health care providers may experience increasing medical liability insurance premiums. Cases are now working their ways through courts that will decide whether the Hilburn holding is applied in medical negligence cases.

On February 13, 2020, the Kansas House Committee on Judiciary introduced House Bill No. 2673 that would fast track cases. If passed, the Kansas Supreme Court would have original jurisdiction to decide “the construction and validity of K.S.A. 60-19a02, and amendments thereto, or any other law that creates a limitation in a medical malpractice liability action on a claim for noneconomic loss, following the decision in the case of Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., No. 112,765, June 14, 2019.” The bill is assigned to the House Appropriations Committee.

Also, the Legislature has studied the possibility of amending the Kansas Constitution to reject the Hilburn holding. To date no resolution has been introduced for such an amendment.

By rule, federal courts in the District of Kansas require that a motion to compel discovery be “filed and served within 30 days of the default or service of the response, answer, or objection that is the subject of the motion, unless the court extends the time for filing such motion for good cause. Otherwise, the objection to the default, response, answer, or objection is deemed waived.” D. Kan. Rule 37.1(b).
This rule may not be as mechanical as it seems.

The rule’s purpose is to “ensure the court can address discovery disputes while they are still fresh, and in turn expedite litigation.” Black & Veatch Corp. v. Aspen Ins. (UK) Ltd., No. 12-2350-SAC-KGS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193782, 2015 WL 13047860 (D. Kan. Mar. 31, 2015). Black & Veatch and other decisions in the district confirm that the triggering event is the date of the challenged discovery response or the discovery default. Black & Veatch interpreted the 30-day period as beginning when specific information first leading to a dispute is discovered. That deadline is not tolled “while the parties are engaged in efforts to resolve the discovery dispute without judicial intervention.” However, the parties may “request, prior to expiration, an extension of the deadline to file a motion to compel with respect to any discovery dispute upon which the parties are still conferring.”

On April 11, 2019, in Lawson v. Spirit Aerosystems, Inc., No. 6:18-cv-01100-EFM-ADM (D. Kan.), a federal magistrate judge denied the defendant’s unopposed motion to extend the deadline. (ECF No. 77) The judge’s order acknowledged “that some judges in this District prefer that parties file such motions on or before the 30-day time period set forth in D. Kan. Rule 37.1(b) expires—e.g., when the parties are continuing to meet and confer to resolve discovery disputes.” Nonetheless, the judge wrote, “[t]he undersigned does not interpret D. Kan. Rule 37.1(b) to require parties to file a motion for extension of time if they are engaged in meeting and conferring.” The judge continued, “[c]ategorical motions for extensions . . . are generally hypothetical and unmeritorious in the abstract.” The judge concluded, “[I]f and when a party files a motion to compel after the 30-day deadline set forth in D. Kan. Rule 37.1(b), the undersigned will, however, expect the party to demonstrate good cause for the late filing by setting forth the parties’ diligence in attempting to resolve the discovery dispute at issue.”

In a later, January 29, 2020, order in that case the judge found the plaintiff’s motion to compel was untimely because the defendant’s alleged failure over a period of months to meet and confer should have been enough to prompt the plaintiff to bring the matter to the court’s attention sooner. (ECF No. 254).

Not every company’s communication with its in-house counsel is privileged. Only confidential communications which involve the requesting or giving of legal advice are privileged. Dartez v. Peters, No. 15-3255-EFM-GEB,2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123178 *43, 2019 WL 3318185 (D. Kan. July 24, 2019). There must be a clear connection “between ‘the subject of the communication and the rendering of legal advice’ for the attorney-client privilege to shield the communication from disclosure.” Id. Further, “legal advice must predominate for the communication to be protected. The privilege does not apply where the legal advice is merely incidental to business advice.” Id.

There is no presumption “that a company’s communications with counsel are privileged.” EEOC v. BDO USA, L.L.P., 856 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2017), opinion withdrawn and superseded, 876 F.3d 690, 695-97 (5th Cir. 2017). The party asserting the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection, bears the burden to show that either the privilege or the protection, or both, apply. Dartez 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123178 *43.

For the attorney-client privilege to apply, Kansas courts require a “clear showing” that the attorney was acting in his or her professional legal capacity. Id. This starts with a “detailed and specific” showing in the privilege log. Id. at **43-44. But the mere conclusory assertion of an attorney-client privilege in the privilege log, “without more information, is insufficient.” Id. at *49. The privilege’s proponent must provide “sufficient information to enable the court to determine whether each element’ of the asserted privilege is satisfied.” Id. at 45. This burden can be met “only by an evidentiary showing based on competent evidence and cannot be discharged by mere conclusory assertions or blanket claims of privilege.” Id. at *44. One court put the same notion this way: “[c]alling the lawyer’s advice as ‘legal’ or ‘business advice’ does not help in reaching a conclusion; it is the conclusion.” United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1502 (9th Cir. 1996).

In federal court, work product protection for the company’s investigation materials depends on whether “(1) the materials sought to be protected are documents or tangible things; (2) they were prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial; and (3) they were prepared by or for a party or a representative of that party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Company materials prepared in the ordinary course of business or investigative work are not protected unless they were done under the supervision of an attorney in preparation “for the real and imminent threat of litigation or trial.” Kannaday v. Ball, 292 F.R.D. 640, 648 (D. Kan. 2013). That means there must be a real and substantial probability that litigation will occur at the time the materials were prepared. Id. Also, courts look “to the primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document to determine whether it constitutes work product. Materials assembled in the ordinary course of business or for other non-litigation purposes are not protected by the work-product doctrine.” Id.

In Dartez, a police brutality case, the plaintiff had issued a records subpoena to the Kansas Highway Patrol for an internal investigation of the Patrol’s Special Response Team. The Patrol responded and logged a 98-page report written by the Patrol’s outside counsel for the Patrol’s Chief Legal Counsel, asserting it was done in anticipation of litigation. Dartez, at **37-38. After an in camera review the court decided the report’s main purpose was to evaluate the Special Response Team’s “operations to make recommendations for improvement and to ensure compliance with current law enforcement practice.” Id. at **49-52. The court found one area in the report that “might come close to being legal advice.” Nonetheless, the court decided it was “incidental to the overall business purpose of the Report.” Id. at *50.

As for whether the report was protected by the work product doctrine, the court noted the Patrol failed to provide any details about anticipated litigation. The court decided,“there is no way to know whether the threat of litigation was ‘real’ and ‘imminent’ at the time the document was prepared.” Id. at *47. The court ordered that the report be produced to the plaintiff.

An adversary’s threats to sue can support a work product claim, but that is not always so. In Lawson v. Spirit Aerosystems, Inc., No. 6:18-cv-01100-EFM-ADM, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176497 (D. Kan. Oct. 8, 2019), the court decided that “[w]here parties continue to resolve disagreements amicably, litigation is ‘not a substantial and significant threat.’”
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176497 *22.

In sum, even when a company is negotiating to resolve a dispute amicably, to ensure that the attorney-client privilege and work product protection applies the company should internally document that its in-house counsel is conducting an investigation in anticipation of litigation and for the purposes of providing legal advice to the company. If the
in-house counsel is providing business advice it should be documented separately from the attorney’s legal advice. Putting business advice and legal advice in the same document risks that a redacted version will be produced in litigation during discovery.

In Bollinger v. Sonic Industries, LLC, No. 126,871 (Kan. Ct. App. May 9, 2025), the Kansas Court of Appeals reminded us that a meritorious defense can justify relief—even if the party dropped the procedural ball.

Sonic was hit with a $107,000 default judgment as a garnishee after answering late and using the “wrong” form. The district court found no excusable neglect and called Sonic’s conduct “reckless indifference.”

But Sonic had a defense: the debtor never worked there.

The appellate court reversed and remanded with directions, holding that:

1. The district court made factual errors. Sonic did eventually use the correct form and did send a copy.
2. It committed a legal error by refusing to consider relief under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(6), the catch-all provision.

Kansas law favors judgments on the merits. When a garnishee never held assets and the debtor wasn’t their employee, the court has discretion to undo a technical default.

Lesson: Even without “excusable neglect,” if you’ve got a real defense, don’t give up.

In Landlords of Lawrence v. City of Lawrence, No. 127,980 (Kan. Ct. App. May 16, 2025), landlords argued that a city ordinance was unconstitutionally vague. Kansas courts apply a two-part test:

1. Does the law give fair notice?
2. Does it guard against arbitrary enforcement?

The Court of Appeals said yes to both. The ordinance simply required landlords who choose to participate in housing subsidy programs to follow those programs’ rules.

As the U.S. Supreme Court has said, “we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.” But this ordinance, the court held, was clear enough to pass constitutional muster.

In my practice as a defense lawyer, I sometimes represent doctors who’ve been sued by inmates representing themselves. One of those cases was filed by Michael Scriven, who brought a §1983 lawsuit against a doctor I represent, other medical providers, and Sedgwick County.

We were able to get the case dismissed as to our client, but the case continued against others. It dragged on for years and eventually settled.

This week, I saw that Mr. Scriven filed yet another lawsuit. In response, the defense team—apparently at their limit filed a motion to label him a vexatious litigant, asking the court to impose pre-filing restrictions.

The case is:
Scriven v. VitalCore Health Strategies LLC,
Case No. 22-cv-3282-EFM-RES (D. Kan. May 20, 2025)
Chief Judge Eric F. Melgren

The judge denied the motion, emphasizing that although Scriven had filed meritless motions and was difficult to deal with, his conduct did not meet the “manifestly abusive” standard required to impose such restrictions. The ruling confirms just how narrow and rarely granted vexatious litigant designations are in federal court.

Key takeaway: Even a long history of difficult pro se litigation isn’t enough on its own—courts require a clear, documented pattern of abuse, not just accumulated aggravation.

In Kansas v. Pfizer, Inc., the federal court ordered the case back to state court… but then hit pause.

Here’s what happened:
Pfizer had removed the case to federal court, arguing that it was acting under a federal officer —a strategy that can sometimes keep lawsuits in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442.

But the judge disagreed and ordered the case remanded to state court.

Before the case could officially land back in Thomas County, Pfizer filed an appeal of the remand order, arguing the court got it wrong about federal-officer jurisdiction.

The judge then ruled: A remand order is automatically stayed for 30 days under Rule 62
Once Pfizer appealed during that window, the federal court lost the power to carry out the remand. remand had already been mailed to the state court, that mailing didn’t count.

Even though the Kansas v. Pfizer, Inc., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103047 (D. Kan. May 30, 2025)

A good reminder that federal procedure can still throw curveballs—even after a seemingly simple remand.

NEW CASE: A.K. v. Heit, No. 126,730 (Kan. Ct. App. June 6, 2025)

The Kansas Court of Appeals today reversed a dismissal with prejudice in a long-running medical malpractice case, finding the trial court abused its discretion by giving the plaintiff only seven days to find substitute counsel after her attorney withdrew for medical reasons.

In A.K. v. Heit, the case had already experienced multiple delays—spanning more than four years—due to COVID-19, discovery disputes, missed deadlines, and attorney illness. After plaintiff’s counsel withdrew shortly before the third trial setting, the court denied further continuance and dismissed the case when no new attorney entered an appearance within a week.

The Court upheld the decision to allow withdrawal and deny a continuance but reversed the with prejudice dismissal, noting the lack of analysis of prejudice to the defendant or alternatives short of dismissal. The panel stressed that while trial courts have broad discretion, the law favors decisions on the merits—especially when the fault lies with counsel, not the litigant.

[June 6, 2025 | Kan. Ct. App. | No. 126,730 | Not designated for publication]

Backdrop: Landlord sought eviction after the tenant fell one month behind on rent. Tenant raised two defenses: uninhabitable conditions (furnace issues, water intrusion) and retaliatory eviction when the landlord refused a relief-agency check delivered within the statutory 3-day window.

What the court said:
1. Habitability is non-waivable. An “as-is” clause can’t erase the landlord’s RLTA duties.
2. Refusing timely payment is a fact issue. Rejecting the charity’s check may bar eviction under K.S.A. 58-2564(b).
3. Trial cut short = error. Ending the bench trial without letting the tenant finish her case requires reversal.

Why it matters:
Landlords who decline rent that cures default—or rely on “as-is” language—risk losing an otherwise straightforward
eviction. Always document habitability repairs and accept cure payments to keep the RLTA on your side.

In civil litigation, we often see initials used for minors, and “John Doe” when a party’s identity is truly unknown. I currently represent a minor plaintiff whose name is abbreviated in the pleadings, and I represent K-State Athletics in a case filed against “John Doe,” the unknown person inside a mascot costume.

But what if a fully identified adult wants to remain anonymous—just to avoid embarrassment?

That was the question in Doe v. University of Kansas Hospital Authority, No. 2:25-cv-02200-HLT-TJJ (D. Kan. June 9, 2025), where adult plaintiffs sued over unauthorized access to their medical records and photographs. They filed under pseudonyms, but the court said no.

Judge Holly Teeter ruled this was not an “exceptional case” justifying pseudonymity under the Tenth Circuit standard.
She emphasized that:

• Claims involving sensitive medical info are not rare enough to warrant exception
• The accessed data was past harm, not future threat
• Embarrassment alone isn’t enough to override the presumption of openness
• Even partial anonymity (e.g., using initials) was denied

Takeaway: In Kansas federal court, pseudonymity is a narrow exception—not available just because medical or emo-
tional issues are involved. If you’re filing suit as an adult, prepare for your name to be part of the public record.

In my practice as a civil defense attorney, I get more than my fair share of cases filed by people representing themselves. Pro se petitions break all the conventions lawyers take for granted: paragraphs aren’t numbered, or they are but not sequential; arguments, legal analysis, and exhibits appear where you’d expect concise factual allegations.

That’s fine. We adapt. But it also reminds me how much of what we consider “the rules” are really just habits we’ve absorbed by watching other lawyers. So what happens when those habits are absent?

The court addressed that in:
Bonjorno v. Kansas,
Case No. 25-1042-JWB (D. Kan. June 11, 2025)
Judge John W. Broomes

The plaintiff’s 101-page amended complaint (plus 38 pages of exhibits) was too disorganized to satisfy Rule 8. The court noted that it read more like a legal brief than a complaint: filled with analysis, conclusions, and narratives, but lacking clear, concise factual allegations that support identifiable claims. While the motion to dismiss remains pending, the court ordered the plaintiff to refile using a standard complaint form.

Key takeaway: Rule 8 doesn’t just require a short and plain statement, it forbids treating the complaint like a summary judgment brief. Pro se or not, the rules still apply.

In Johnson v. Smith, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110772 (D. Kan. June 11, 2025), Judge Kathryn Vratil held that Kansas law requiring surprise, warrantless inspections of boarding and training kennels violates the Fourth Amendment. The Court also struck down the practice of requiring licensees to waive their constitutional rights in order to renew their annual licenses.

Why it matters:
This ruling enjoins the State from conducting these routine warrantless inspections unless they get a warrant or obtain voluntary consent. It doesn’t block all inspections—initial inspections, complaint-based inspections, and inspections under an administrative warrant are still allowed. But the decision effectively invalidates the current model of mandatory, unannounced searches as a condition of licensure.

Big takeaway: The Court rejected the argument that this was a “closely regulated industry” and emphasized that dog training and boarding businesses are not inherently dangerous and don’t justify bypassing the warrant requirement.

This case could influence how other states structure their licensing and inspection regimes—not just for kennels, but for any business trying to balance regulation with constitutional rights.

Some types of recourse may not be available to you.

In Sky Jet v. VSE Aviation, the buyer tried. They bought an aircraft part through a third-party distributor. That part had been overhauled by VSE Aviation—and when it allegedly failed, Sky Jet sued VSE for negligence and unjust enrichment.

But here’s the catch: Even though unjust enrichment doesn’t require a formal contract (and not even privity), it still requires some kind of connection. The court said there has to be “contact between the party conferring the benefit and the recipient.” Just being the original seller in the chain wasn’t enough.

Judge Teeter: “To find that this satisfies the elements of unjust enrichment would open up every consumer transaction to such a claim against a manufacturer.”

Claim denied. VSE wins summary judgment on unjust enrichment.
Sky Jet M.G. Inc. v. VSE Aviation Servs., LLC, No. 2:23-cv-02210-HLT, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112924 (D. Kan. June 13,
2025)

In Kansans for Constitutional Freedom v. Kobach, No. 24-2194-DDC (D. Kan. June 18 2025), Judge Crabtree granted one public-interest group permission to file an amicus curiae brief at the trial-court stage, explaining that outside perspective can help resolve issues affecting Kansans far beyond the named parties.

That fits my own experience:

• Wrote an amicus brief at the Kansas Supreme Court for the Kansas Association of Defense Counsel

• Served as Kansas local counsel for an amicus filing by the National Shooting Sports Foundation

Whether the question involves voting rules, product liability, or firearm regulation, a well-timed amicus brief lets allied organizations shape the record and frame key legal themes long before an appeal. Takeaway: if a case could shift the landscape for an entire industry or advocacy community, consider seeking amicus status in the district court, not just on appeal.

In Teetz v. Stepien, No. 23-1078 (10th Cir. June 2025), the court let an excessive-force claim proceed to trial after officers held a restrained juvenile facedown for roughly 30 minutes. Relying on Weigel (2008), the panel held that a reasonable jury could find the extended pressure objectively un-reasonable under clearly established law, so qualified immunity was unavailable at summary judgment. Key doctrinal points:

• Force that is reasonable at the initial takedown can become excessive once control is secure

• Prolonged weight on a restrained, prone suspect may be deemed “deadly force” if it creates a substantial risk of serious harm

• The qualified-immunity inquiry looks to both the duration of force and evolving medical understanding of positional asphyxia