NEW CASE: A.K. v. Heit, No. 126,730 (Kan. Ct. App. June 6, 2025)

The Kansas Court of Appeals today reversed a dismissal with prejudice in a long-running medical malpractice case, finding the trial court abused its discretion by giving the plaintiff only seven days to find substitute counsel after her attorney withdrew for medical reasons.

In A.K. v. Heit, the case had already experienced multiple delays—spanning more than four years—due to COVID-19, discovery disputes, missed deadlines, and attorney illness. After plaintiff’s counsel withdrew shortly before the third trial setting, the court denied further continuance and dismissed the case when no new attorney entered an appearance within a week.

The Court upheld the decision to allow withdrawal and deny a continuance but reversed the with prejudice dismissal, noting the lack of analysis of prejudice to the defendant or alternatives short of dismissal. The panel stressed that while trial courts have broad discretion, the law favors decisions on the merits—especially when the fault lies with counsel, not the litigant.

[June 6, 2025 | Kan. Ct. App. | No. 126,730 | Not designated for publication]

Backdrop: Landlord sought eviction after the tenant fell one month behind on rent. Tenant raised two defenses: uninhabitable conditions (furnace issues, water intrusion) and retaliatory eviction when the landlord refused a relief-agency check delivered within the statutory 3-day window.

What the court said:
1. Habitability is non-waivable. An “as-is” clause can’t erase the landlord’s RLTA duties.
2. Refusing timely payment is a fact issue. Rejecting the charity’s check may bar eviction under K.S.A. 58-2564(b).
3. Trial cut short = error. Ending the bench trial without letting the tenant finish her case requires reversal.

Why it matters:
Landlords who decline rent that cures default—or rely on “as-is” language—risk losing an otherwise straightforward
eviction. Always document habitability repairs and accept cure payments to keep the RLTA on your side.

In civil litigation, we often see initials used for minors, and “John Doe” when a party’s identity is truly unknown. I currently represent a minor plaintiff whose name is abbreviated in the pleadings, and I represent K-State Athletics in a case filed against “John Doe,” the unknown person inside a mascot costume.

But what if a fully identified adult wants to remain anonymous—just to avoid embarrassment?

That was the question in Doe v. University of Kansas Hospital Authority, No. 2:25-cv-02200-HLT-TJJ (D. Kan. June 9, 2025), where adult plaintiffs sued over unauthorized access to their medical records and photographs. They filed under pseudonyms, but the court said no.

Judge Holly Teeter ruled this was not an “exceptional case” justifying pseudonymity under the Tenth Circuit standard.
She emphasized that:

• Claims involving sensitive medical info are not rare enough to warrant exception
• The accessed data was past harm, not future threat
• Embarrassment alone isn’t enough to override the presumption of openness
• Even partial anonymity (e.g., using initials) was denied

Takeaway: In Kansas federal court, pseudonymity is a narrow exception—not available just because medical or emo-
tional issues are involved. If you’re filing suit as an adult, prepare for your name to be part of the public record.

In my practice as a civil defense attorney, I get more than my fair share of cases filed by people representing themselves. Pro se petitions break all the conventions lawyers take for granted: paragraphs aren’t numbered, or they are but not sequential; arguments, legal analysis, and exhibits appear where you’d expect concise factual allegations.

That’s fine. We adapt. But it also reminds me how much of what we consider “the rules” are really just habits we’ve absorbed by watching other lawyers. So what happens when those habits are absent?

The court addressed that in:
Bonjorno v. Kansas,
Case No. 25-1042-JWB (D. Kan. June 11, 2025)
Judge John W. Broomes

The plaintiff’s 101-page amended complaint (plus 38 pages of exhibits) was too disorganized to satisfy Rule 8. The court noted that it read more like a legal brief than a complaint: filled with analysis, conclusions, and narratives, but lacking clear, concise factual allegations that support identifiable claims. While the motion to dismiss remains pending, the court ordered the plaintiff to refile using a standard complaint form.

Key takeaway: Rule 8 doesn’t just require a short and plain statement, it forbids treating the complaint like a summary judgment brief. Pro se or not, the rules still apply.

In Johnson v. Smith, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110772 (D. Kan. June 11, 2025), Judge Kathryn Vratil held that Kansas law requiring surprise, warrantless inspections of boarding and training kennels violates the Fourth Amendment. The Court also struck down the practice of requiring licensees to waive their constitutional rights in order to renew their annual licenses.

Why it matters:
This ruling enjoins the State from conducting these routine warrantless inspections unless they get a warrant or obtain voluntary consent. It doesn’t block all inspections—initial inspections, complaint-based inspections, and inspections under an administrative warrant are still allowed. But the decision effectively invalidates the current model of mandatory, unannounced searches as a condition of licensure.

Big takeaway: The Court rejected the argument that this was a “closely regulated industry” and emphasized that dog training and boarding businesses are not inherently dangerous and don’t justify bypassing the warrant requirement.

This case could influence how other states structure their licensing and inspection regimes—not just for kennels, but for any business trying to balance regulation with constitutional rights.

Some types of recourse may not be available to you.

In Sky Jet v. VSE Aviation, the buyer tried. They bought an aircraft part through a third-party distributor. That part had been overhauled by VSE Aviation—and when it allegedly failed, Sky Jet sued VSE for negligence and unjust enrichment.

But here’s the catch: Even though unjust enrichment doesn’t require a formal contract (and not even privity), it still requires some kind of connection. The court said there has to be “contact between the party conferring the benefit and the recipient.” Just being the original seller in the chain wasn’t enough.

Judge Teeter: “To find that this satisfies the elements of unjust enrichment would open up every consumer transaction to such a claim against a manufacturer.”

Claim denied. VSE wins summary judgment on unjust enrichment.
Sky Jet M.G. Inc. v. VSE Aviation Servs., LLC, No. 2:23-cv-02210-HLT, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112924 (D. Kan. June 13,
2025)

In Kansans for Constitutional Freedom v. Kobach, No. 24-2194-DDC (D. Kan. June 18 2025), Judge Crabtree granted one public-interest group permission to file an amicus curiae brief at the trial-court stage, explaining that outside perspective can help resolve issues affecting Kansans far beyond the named parties.

That fits my own experience:

• Wrote an amicus brief at the Kansas Supreme Court for the Kansas Association of Defense Counsel

• Served as Kansas local counsel for an amicus filing by the National Shooting Sports Foundation

Whether the question involves voting rules, product liability, or firearm regulation, a well-timed amicus brief lets allied organizations shape the record and frame key legal themes long before an appeal. Takeaway: if a case could shift the landscape for an entire industry or advocacy community, consider seeking amicus status in the district court, not just on appeal.

In Teetz v. Stepien, No. 23-1078 (10th Cir. June 2025), the court let an excessive-force claim proceed to trial after officers held a restrained juvenile facedown for roughly 30 minutes. Relying on Weigel (2008), the panel held that a reasonable jury could find the extended pressure objectively un-reasonable under clearly established law, so qualified immunity was unavailable at summary judgment. Key doctrinal points:

• Force that is reasonable at the initial takedown can become excessive once control is secure

• Prolonged weight on a restrained, prone suspect may be deemed “deadly force” if it creates a substantial risk of serious harm

• The qualified-immunity inquiry looks to both the duration of force and evolving medical understanding of positional asphyxia

In my work defending Kansas cities, counties, schools, and universities when accidents happen in parks, gyms, libraries, and similar spots, this new decision grabbed my attention.

Kansas Supreme Court: recreation immunity covers libraries and their parking lots

A visitor fell in a Johnson County library parking lot and sued.
The Court held the county is protected by the Kansas Tort Claims Act’s recreational-use rule, which applies to places meant for leisure activities, indoors or outdoors.

Plain-language takeaways

• Recreation is broader than parks or trails. A library qualifies because people visit to read, study, and attend programs.

• The shield reaches connected areas like sidewalks and parking lots if they serve the recreational space.

• To succeed, an injured visitor must prove the government acted in a grossly or wantonly unsafe way. Ordinary carelessness is not enough.

Bottom line: when you enjoy public spaces designed for recreation, the government is immune from a typical slip-and-fall claim unless its conduct was truly reckless.

Zaragoza v. Board of Johnson County Commissioners, No. 126,732 (Kan. June 27, 2025)

In LDG Rentals, LLC v. Western World Ins. Co., No. 23-cv-01216-TC (D. Kan. June 18 2025), a 125-year-old brick building in Coffeyville partially collapsed. The policy pays for an “abrupt collapse” caused by “building decay that is hidden from view, unless the presence of such decay is known to an insured prior to collapse.”

Western World asked for summary judgment, claiming:
• The structure was already damaged before the policy incepted, so it wasn’t “Covered Property”
• Any decay was visible, making the loss non-fortuitous and therefore uncovered under Kansas law Judge Toby Crouse denied the motion. Pre-collapse inspections by the buyers, their insurance agent, and an under-writing survey all reported no visible decay. That record created genuine disputes about (1) whether the building was damaged before the policy and (2) whether the collapse was truly a hidden-decay, fortuitous event. Those questions go to a jury.

Takeaway: In old-structure cases, coverage often turns on visibility and knowledge of decay. If “hidden” vs. “known” is
debatable, a fortuity defense won’t win on summary judgment.